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1. Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol provides an international framework for
reducing GHG emissions. The Protocol set binding targets for 37
industrialized countries and the European community for reducing
emissions of the sixmain greenhouse gases (GHG) by an average of
ﬁve per cent against 1990 levels, by 2012. The Parties to the
Convention decreed at Bali in 2007 that an ‘ambitious and effective
international response’ to further the Protocol at the end of ﬁrst
commitment period would be agreed at Copenhagen in December
2009 (UNFCCC, 2009).
We focus here on the UK, which has taken the lead at a national
level in setting mitigation targets. The UK Climate Change Bill calls
for an 80% GHG emissions reduction by 2050 relative to 1990 (HM
Government, 2008). This level of response to climate change has
profound implications for individual choices and behavior, as well
as for the social structures within which these take place. With
over one-third of many developed nations’ carbon emissions
coming from private travel and domestic energy use (Defra,
2007a), individuals clearly have a key role to play in any potential
shift towards a low-carbon society. Besides reducing their direct
emissions (e.g., conserving gas or electricity in the home), an
individual can act in several roles to promote a low-carbon society,
including being a low-carbon consumer (e.g., buying energy-
efﬁcient appliances or local, seasonal food), a low-carbon
employee (through professional decisions and workplace behav-
ior), and a low-carbon citizen (e.g., voting for a ‘green’ policy;
joining an environmental campaign or community action group).
Indeed, individual behavior change (encouraged primarily through
economic and informational approaches) has been a key feature of
recent UK government climate change and environmental policy
(e.g., HM Government, 2009; Hinchliffe, 1996; Ockwell et al.,
2009).
At the moment, however, public engagement with climate
change in the UK (as elsewhere) is limited, with energy demand for
both domestic uses and transport rising (Defra, 2006). Clearly, new
tools and approaches are required in order to achieve the sort of
ambitious carbon-reduction targets being pioneered by the UK.
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One such proposal is ‘personal carbon budgets’ whereby indivi-
duals are issued with an annual carbon ‘ration’ (Roberts and
Thumin, 2006), but this is only an extreme version of the
generalized responsibility for carbon-reduction which is being
placed at individuals’ feet. Given the policy preference for
voluntary action by individuals (as opposed to top-down regula-
tion; e.g., Carter and Ockwell, 2007), what conditions would be
most conducive to a successful policy implementation?
Policy proposals relying on individuals’ voluntary carbon
reduction highlight the need for at least some level of public
understanding of the causes and consequences of carbon emis-
sions, aswell as the ability andmotivation for individuals to reduce
emissions. However, little has been done to consider the situated
meanings of carbon and energy in everyday life and decisions.
Seyfang et al. (2007) have proposed the concept of ‘carbon
capability’ to capture the contextual meanings associated with
carbon and individuals’ ability andmotivation to reduce emissions,
but this model has not hitherto been empirically applied. This
paper aims to address that knowledge gap by presenting an initial
study of public carbon capability. The paper beginswith a review of
theoretical and policy contexts around public engagement with
climate change, conceptualizing climate change and carbon, and
an elaboration of the carbon capability model. It then presents
empirical ﬁndings from a UK survey of public engagement with
climate change and carbon capability, focusing on both individual
and institutional dimensions. In so doing, we attempt a novel
synthesis between psychological and sociological approaches to
behavior change.We then discuss the ﬁndings and implications for
policy, in terms of measures to increase carbon capability in the
populace, and conclude with reﬂections on the limitations of
individual-focused instruments to achieve lifestyle change in
social context.
2. Background
2.1. Public engagement with climate change
Although there is widespread global recognition of climate
change, there is a general lack of knowledge and emotional
engagement with the issue (BBC World Service, 2007; Defra,
2007b; Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Surveys show that awareness and
concern about climate change have increased over the past two
decades (Defra, 2002, 2007b), but in the context of other, more
immediate or tangible concerns (e.g., health, ﬁnances), climate
change takes a low priority (e.g., Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2003). The
low relative importance of climate change reﬂects a widespread
perception amongst the public that the issue is a spatially and
temporally remote risk, affecting future generations and other
countries (O’Neill and Hulme, 2009). While it is considered socially
relevant,most individuals do not feel it poses a prominent personal
threat (e.g., Bord et al., 2000). Furthermore, people tend to identify
causes of climate change with other people or groups, such as SUV
drivers, industry, the US or China (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006;
Whitmarsh, 2009b).
Behavioral engagement with climate change is even more
limited. Surveys indicate around a third of the public aremaking an
effort to drive or ﬂy less (Defra, 2007b). When asked what actions
they would be willing to undertake (or are already undertaking) to
address climate change, recycling and energy conservation in the
home are the most frequently mentioned, while there is
considerable resistance to changing travel habits (Defra, 2007b;
Whitmarsh, 2009a). In relation to energy policies, incentives and
technological solutions receive more support than taxes or higher
bills (Defra, 2002; O’Connor et al., 1999).
One might assume that the low levels of energy conservation
action are due to a lack of awareness on the part of individuals as to
the most effective actions to take. Yet, while some misperceptions
exist, it is striking that surveys suggest a high level of
understanding amongst the public as to which behaviors contrib-
ute to the problem. For example, a UK survey that polled over 3600
individuals found more than 75% of respondents believed ‘using a
car less’ and ‘ﬂying less’ would have a ‘medium ormajor impact’ on
reducing the UK’s contribution to climate change (Defra, 2007b).
The same survey, however, showed that less than a quarter of those
polled believe that the UK public would be willing to take these
actions.
The disparity between public awareness about climate change
on the one hand, and the limited behavioral response on the other
is consistent with the widely reported ‘value-action’ gap (e.g.,
Blake, 1999). In other words, people often do not act in accordance
with what they know or care about. The value-action gap points to
the complex interactions of psychological, social and environmen-
tal factors in the production of behavior (e.g., Stern, 2000). Indeed,
behavior is not always preceded by conscious deliberation at all,
notably in the case of habits (van Vliet et al., 2005). This is
particularly true in the case of travel behaviors (e.g., Verplanken et
al., 1998). Furthermore, climate change in particular, as a complex,
uncertain, global, and long-term issue, is particularly difﬁcult to
understand and relate to at the individual level. Various barriers
exist to increasing public knowledge, interest, concern, and –
above all – action in relation to climate change. These barriers
occur at two interrelated levels – individual and social – and
include lack of knowledge, skepticism and distrust of information,
feeling disempowered, competing priorities and values, perceived
inaction by others, social norms (to consume) and physical/
infrastructural impediments (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Clearly, then,
there are structural constraints and disincentives to leading low-
carbon lifestyles which militate against individuals acting in
accordance with their awareness of climate change.
2.2. Understanding the unfamiliar: conceptualizing climate change
and carbon
Climate change is an issue which poses major challenges to
communicators and educators. It is a risk ‘buried’ in familiar
natural processes such as temperature change and weather
ﬂuctuations (Ungar, 2000), and has low salience as a risk issue
because it cannot be directly experienced. Since people are
accustomed to considerable weather and temperature variation
on a daily and seasonal basis they underestimate the effects of a
predicted rise in global temperatures of a few degrees (Berk and
Schulman, 1995; Kempton, 1991). The World Meteorological
Organisation uses consecutive periods of weather over a period of
30 years to calculate a ‘climate’ average: and thus – unlike an
individual weather event – ‘climate’ is not directly observable.
Conﬁdence in projections of climate change impacts decreases
with scale – with regional, and especially local, impacts often
poorly described (IPCC, 2001), meaning the risks posed by climate
change to individuals are ill-deﬁned. Furthermore, reliance on
second-hand information about the reality and severity of the risk
of climate changemeans the risk is deﬁned and interpreted by both
the information source and message recipient (cf. Petty and
Cacioppo, 1986). Uncertainty about climate change can be
exaggerated by the media, which tends to emphasize the scientiﬁc
and political controversy surrounding the issue (e.g., Boykoff and
Boykoff, 2004).
Given the intangibility, complexity and uncertainty of climate
change, how do individuals learn about it, and in what ways (if at
all) is this understanding integrated into existing knowledge and
applied in daily decisions? Here, it is useful to refer to the cognitive
and social psychology literatures relating to individual learning.
Both highlight the relational and constructivist nature of learning,
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whereby individuals interpret new experiences in light of, and
build new understanding around, existing concepts and beliefs
(Marshall, 1995). One of the major social psychological theories of
perception and social inﬂuence is Moscovici’s (1988) Social
Representations Theory, which identiﬁes two key processes
involved in understanding and evaluating changes in the social/
physical environment: ‘objectiﬁcation’ (translating the abstract
into the concrete and tangible) and ‘anchoring’ (categorising
according to pre-existing cognitive frameworks thus rendering
familiar). Crucially, these cognitive frameworks arise from cultural,
as well as psychological, origins and are often normative in nature:
‘most of our reasoning in societies depends on categories of right or
wrong more than those of true or false’ (Moscovici, 1993, p. 166).
This appropriation of new knowledge in turn changes it, through
processes of assimilation and accommodation (Piaget, 1970). This
theory has been applied to understand the interaction of science
and society, and the evolution and communication of scientiﬁc
knowledge (as a function of subject, object and contextual factors;
Bauer and Gaskell, 2008), and is particularly appropriate for the
area of risk, where concepts or issues are likely to be novel and
unfamiliar (Breakwell, 1991).
Returning to the issue of climate change, we see these processes
of assimilation, accommodation, objectiﬁcation and anchoring at
work in the language used to describe climate change and in the
way new information about the issue is interpreted. Recent
research sheds some light on how people integrate new concepts
such as climate change into existing knowledge through linguistic
constructivism. Nerlich and Koteyko (2009) have tracked the rise
of lexical ‘carbon compounds’ used in the mass media to
communicate climate change. The most prevalent carbon com-
pounds they have identiﬁed relate to: ﬁnance (e.g., ‘carbon tax’,
‘carbon budget’); lifestyle (e.g., ‘carbon footprint’, ‘carbon diet’);
and morality/religion (e.g., ‘carbon sinner’, ‘carbon indulgences’).
Whitmarsh (2009b) found different terminology about climate
change is understood in different ways and evokes different
responses: ‘global warming’ is associated more readily with heat-
related impacts, ozone depletion and human causes than ‘climate
change’, which is more often seem as having natural causes and a
range of impacts; furthermore, ‘global warming’ is seen as more
important and concerning than ‘climate change’.
Previous research also highlights the resistance to change of
existing mental models of risks, such that novel information may
be misinterpreted in light of these pre-existing ideas: Kempton
(1991) found that individuals often link ozone depletion and
climate change and that, even when presented with information
about climate change which makes no reference to ozone,
individuals continue to connect the two issues. In general, there
is a tendency to conceptually integrate climate change and other
(similar) environmental phenomena or problems, notably weath-
er, air pollution and ozone depletion (e.g., Whitmarsh, 2009b).
Consistent with this, recent qualitative research on public
understanding of energy consumption concluded that ‘many
participants were unable to distinguish terms such as the ozone
layer, greenhouse gases and carbon emissions from the perceived
‘‘science babble’’’ (Brooke Lyndhurst, 2007, p. 9). There is also a
conﬂation of solutions to environmental problems: recycling tends
to be seen as a panacea for all environmental problems, or is
perhaps a tokenistic, symbolic gesture of environmental concern
(Whitmarsh, 2009a).
There is low salience of climate change, energy and sustain-
ability in individuals’ day-to-day choices and actions (e.g.,
Macnaghten and Jacobs, 1997; Whitmarsh, 2009a). Growing
awareness of environmental problems at an abstract or general
level tends not to be translated into personally relevant cognitions
or motivating attitudes (Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Furthermore,
neither energy consumption (including embodied energy and
potential future energy savings) nor environmental impact is
typically consideredwhen buying appliances (forwhich initial cost
is the primary motivating factor; Brooke Lyndhurst, 2007).
Understanding about environmental issues tends to be limited
to abstract or vague concepts; for example while most people are
aware of the main causes of climate change, understanding about
the relative contribution of different activities to causing climate
change is lower and there is confusion associated with emissions-
related terminology (e.g., carbon dioxide, carbon, carbon equiva-
lent) and difﬁculty visualizing quantiﬁcation of emissions (Anable
et al., 2006; DfT, 2007).
Awareness of the concept of ‘carbon footprints’ and the use of
carbon calculators are growing but are not yet widespread1.
Nevertheless, exploratory research suggests they can help make
carbon and climate change more personally relevant and link
energy choices to environmental impact; there is particular value
in providing comparative information, so that individuals under-
stand the relative contribution of different activities and how their
lifestyles compare to others locally, nationally and globally (DfT,
2007). In this sense, relevant information is individually and
socially contextualized. Yet, these concepts and tools will not
necessarily motivate behavior change where individuals are not
motivated to change or perceive barriers to doing so. Indeed,
amongst users of carbon calculators, many (though by no means
all) use such tools to offset their emissions rather than to change
their energy consumption behavior (DfT, 2007). In some cases,
these tools only serve to highlight the lack of individual control
over potentially major carbon saving actions (e.g., lack of
insulation in rented accommodation), and the minimal effect of
other, directly controllable, choices (e.g., using energy-efﬁcient
lightbulbs). Clearly, information provision of any kind, even
packaged in a personally relevant, user-friendly and contextual-
ized form, cannot address competing values or the wider,
structural barriers to low-carbon lifestyles mentioned above.
Furthermore, as Hargreaves (2010) shows in relation to smart
energy meters in the home, this type of information provision may
even be counter-productive if it results in individuals feeling guilty
about consumption they feel unable to reduce, or otherwise
disempowered, disinterested or cynical about such attempts by
government to ‘educate’ the public by locating responsibility for
climate action with individuals.
2.3. Carbon capability
There is some convergence of ﬁndings from the (primarily
quantitative)work around public engagementwith climate change
(Section 2.1), and the (primarily qualitative) work on learning
about climate change and carbon (Section 2.2). In particular, these
two literatures demonstrate that both individual and institutional
dimensions of engagement are vital to understanding (barriers to)
adoption of low-carbon lifestyles. Furthermore, they highlight the
need to understand the ‘situated’ meanings associated with
carbon; that is, how individuals translate and apply knowledge
about carbon and climate change to their daily lives (for example
through processes of objectiﬁcation and anchoring).
Seyfang et al. (2007) have proposed the concept of ‘carbon
capability’ to capture the contextual meanings associated with
1 Defra’s 2009 survey found 48% of the public claimed to know ‘a lot’ or ‘a fair
amount’ about carbon footprints, compared to just 25% in 2007(Defra, 2009).
Between 2008 and 2009, around 10% of the public claimed to use a carbon calculator
to calculate their carbon footprint (up from 3% in the previous year), while around
40% were aware of advertising about carbon calculators or carbon footprints (TNS,
2009a). Evaluation of the latest UK government climate change campaign, ‘Act on
CO2’, suggests use of the online campaign information (including a carbon
calculator) is relatively low, compared to (passively) learning about low-carbon
behaviours from advertising on television and other mass media (TNS, 2009b).
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carbon and the individual ability and motivation to reduce
emissions. Carbon capability is deﬁned as: ‘The ability to make
informed judgments and to take effective decisions regarding the
use and management of carbon, through both individual behavior
change and collective action’ (Whitmarsh et al., 2009). We identify
three core dimensions of carbon capability:
(1) decision-making (knowledge, skills, motivations and judg-
ments),
(2) individual behavior or ‘practices’ (e.g., energy conservation),
and
(3) broader engagementwith systems of provision and governance
(e.g., lobbying, voting, protesting, creating alternative social
infrastructures of provision).
In contrast to the concept of ‘carbon literacy’, then, carbon
capability is not deﬁned in a narrow individualistic sense of solely
knowledge, skills and motivations (although these are important
components); rather, the concept of carbon capability implies an
understanding of the limits of individual action and where these
encounter wider societal institutions and infrastructure, and so
prompt the need for collective action and other governance
solutions. The notion also suggests an appreciation that much
consumption (and hence carbon emissions) is inconspicuous,
habitual and routine, rather than the result of conscious decision-
making (van Vliet et al., 2005). Consistent with the literature on
social practices and structuration (e.g., Giddens, 1984; Spaargaren,
2003), we see individual cognitive decisions about consumption as
mediated through socially shaped lifestyle choices, resulting in
sets of practices which are in turn delimited by social systems of
provision and the rules and resources of macro-level
structures. That is, individual choices both shape and are shaped
by wider social structures.
Fig. 1 depicts these three dimensions of carbon capability
(mapped onto the social practices model of sustainable consump-
tion; Spaargaren, 2003), which comprise decision-making, behav-
ioral and structural aspects. As mentioned, people face
considerable obstacles to low-carbon lifestyles (Lorenzoni et al.,
2007). Therefore, fully carbon capable actors will be aware of, and
seek to inﬂuence through collective and political mechanisms, the
right-hand side of the diagram (i.e., policies, systems of provision,
infrastructure, etc.) in order to overcome the structural barriers to
low-carbon lifestyles and societies. This key point about carbon
capability contrasts with the current policy emphasis on achieving
behavioral change (dimension 2) through efforts to inﬂuence
actors’ cognitive and motivational processes (dimension 1) (e.g.,
Ockwell et al., 2009). Our contribution is to integrate a consider-
ation of the sociological factors which inﬂuence practices
(dimension 2), and so to direct attention towards broader issues
around institutional carbon governance (dimension 3).
Carbon capability is an analogue to ﬁnancial capability applied
to human-caused climate change (Seyfang et al., 2007). Financial
capability can be deﬁned as ‘the ability to make informed
judgments and to take effective decisions regarding the use and
management of money’ (National Foundation for Educational
Research, quoted in AdFLAG, 2000, para 4.2) and includes:
managing money, planning ahead, choosing products and staying
informed (Atkinson et al., 2007). Translating these concepts and
techniques into carbon management, ‘carbon capability’ therefore
refers to technical, material and social aspects of knowledge,
understanding and practice. Indeed, there are the same driving
forces, and comparable consumer issues with both types of
capability, which require a holistic approach to learning about
sustainable consumption in both ﬁnancial and resource terms
(Seyfang et al., 2007).
Managing material consumption and managing carbon are also
similar in the way that they have intangible aspects. The sheer
intangibility of credit ﬁnance compared with cash has also
contributed to its widespread acceptance (although recently cash
has made a comeback, as a visible way of controlling spending;
BRC, 2008), bringing attendant social problems (Cohen, 2007;
witness also the current ‘credit-crunch’-driven recession). Simi-
larly, the negative impacts of increasing carbon emissions are
easily ignored because of their intangibility. One of the challenges
therefore for promoting carbon capability is to increase the
visibility of carbon and re-materialize energy use in day-to-day
activities and choices (Burgess and Nye, 2008). Carbon capability is
about transforming understandings of carbon from an inevitable
(invisible and overlooked) waste product of modern lifestyles, to a
potent contributor to the atmospheric system, a substance to be
carefully managed.
From the perspective of individual learning, we draw on the
literature pertaining to public understanding of science, and argue
that carbon capability implies a situated understanding of carbon.
In recent years, there has been a shift away from seeing scientiﬁc
literacy as deﬁned by knowledge of abstract scientiﬁc ‘facts’,
towards investigating the contextual meanings of science applied
in everyday life. This broader,more socially embedded deﬁnition of
scientiﬁc literacy includes an understanding of the dynamic
process of scientiﬁc knowledge construction (rather than science
as a codiﬁed and stable body of knowledge) and of scientiﬁc
uncertainty, as well as how day-to-day decisions can be informed
by scientiﬁc concepts and perspectives (e.g., Claeson et al., 1996;
Whitmarsh et al., 2005). Scientiﬁc knowledge (e.g., ‘facts’ about
GHG emissions) is interpreted in diverse ways by different
individuals – according to their prior beliefs, knowledge, emotions,
and situational factors. Furthermore, abstract scientiﬁc informa-
tion may not be useful to inform individual decision-making:
‘While there may be no particular need for the public to engage at
the deepest level of understanding, clearly there is a need for the
public to better understand their individual contribution to climate
change. This is especially true for those participants that expressed
a desire to contributemore personally to climate change reduction’
(emphasis added; DfT, 2007, p. 32).
As illustrated in Section 2.2, information provision is inade-
quate to encourage lifestyle change or promote public acceptance
of policy. The so-called ‘information deﬁcit’ model, which assumes
that the public are ‘empty vessels’ waiting to be ﬁlled with
information which will propel them into rational action, has
implicitly underpinned much public policy but is widely criticized
as inappropriate and ineffective (e.g., Irwin andWynne, 1996). This
[(Fig._1)TD$FIG]
Fig. 1. The three individual and structural dimensions of carbon capability (mapped
onto the social practices model of sustainable consumption; Spaargaren, 2003).
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is not to say that education is not part of an effective public
engagement and social change agenda (indeed, carbon capability
implies that agents have speciﬁc knowledge pertaining to, for
example, the relative associated emissions of particular beha-
viors); but rather that it should be based on an understanding of
individuals’ existing knowledge, their concerns and abilities, and
broader institutional relationships, and should be accompanied by
efforts to provide greater opportunities for public participation in
democratic policy-making to transform the structural constraints
on practice choice sets.
Similarly, we argue that there is a need to avoid a ‘deﬁcit model’
in relation to carbon literacy, and to explore situated meanings of
carbon and energy in everyday life and decisions, within the
broader context of structural opportunities for and barriers to low-
carbon lifestyles. Further, given the complexity and uncertainty
(both informational and moral) associated with climate change
(see Hulme, 2009), carbon capability implies an ability to evaluate
the reliability (bias, agenda, uncertainty, etc.) of different
information sources about how to achieve a carbon capable
lifestyle. For example, media representation of climate change as
controversial and uncertain may be more reﬂective of journalistic
norms (of balance, dramatization, politicization, etc.) than of
schismwithinmainstream scientiﬁc opinion (Boykoff and Boykoff,
2004; Hargreaves et al., 2003). Currently, however, much of the
public is poorly equipped to deal with scientiﬁc uncertainty and
tend to be confused by expert disagreement; for example, most
people agree that ‘there is so much conﬂicting information about
science that it is difﬁcult to know what to believe’ (Poortinga and
Pidgeon, 2003).
Drawing on these literatures on ﬁnancial capability, scientiﬁc
literacy, and sustainable consumption, leads us to consider carbon
capability as implying a critical understanding of:
 the causes and consequences of carbon emissions;
 the role individuals – and particular activities – play in producing
carbon emissions;
 the scope for (and beneﬁts of) adopting a low-carbon lifestyle;
 what is possible through individual action;
 which carbon-reduction activities require collective action and
infrastructural change;
 managing a carbon budget;
 information sources – and their reliability (in terms of bias,
agenda, uncertainty, etc.) – for achieving a carbon capable
lifestyle; and
 the broader structural limits to and opportunities for sustainable
consumption.
While the research reviewed above begins to shed light on these
dimensions of carbon capability, there is much more work to be
done to determine the nature and extent of carbon capability
amongst the public. Initial research evaluating the evolution and
application by individuals, households and communities of new
carbon concepts and tools (e.g., ‘carbon footprints’, ‘carbon
calculators’) has been conducted with relatively small samples
(DfT, 2007); we have sought to expand the scale and scope of this
exploratory work through a UK survey of public engagement with
climate change and carbon capability, focusing on both individual
and institutional dimensions.
3. Methods
As an initial investigation of the nature and extent of carbon
capability amongst the public, we carried out a postal survey in
August–October 2008 in Norfolk and Hampshire, UK. Three
thousand questionnaires were distributed to a random sample
of residents, drawn from the electoral register, within nine wards
(six in Norfolk, three in Hampshire) representing both urban and
rural and diverse socio-demographic proﬁles (see Supplementary
Material). The eight-page questionnaire included both closed and
open questions, and addressed knowledge, understanding, atti-
tudes, values and behaviors, as well as demographic variables.
Several of the measures used, including behavioral measures (see
Defra, 2008), were adapted from previous studies. (In addition to
questions about carbon capability, attitudes to climate change and
carbon offsetting were also measured; these ﬁndings are reported
elsewhere, see e.g., Whitmarsh et al., 2009). Questionnaires were
piloted and revised according to feedback from pilot respondents.
In total, we received 551 responses from the postal survey
(representing a response rate of 18.4%). Participants in the postal
survey were broadly demographically representative of the total
population sampled (see Supplementary Material), although
somewhat more qualiﬁed (26% have a degree, slightly more than
the national average of 20% according to 2001 census data).
Quantitative data was analyzed in SPSS; and qualitative data was
coded thematically in NVivo.
4. Exploring the three dimensions of carbon capability
4.1. Individual decision-making
4.1.1. Awareness and knowledge about climate change
Consistent with previous research, we ﬁnd that awareness of
climate change is very high. Less than 1% has not heard of climate
change at all; and the largest proportion (56%) says they know ‘a
fair amount’ about it. A further 10% say they know ‘a lot’, and 29%
know ‘just a little’.
Furthermore, most people (85.6%) agree with the statement
‘climate change is caused by both natural processes and human
activity’. However, this proportion seems rather high when
compared with responses to other questions in this survey on
skepticism and uncertainty about climate change, which suggest a
sizeable minority continue to doubt whether human activities
inﬂuence climate. For example, 25.2% of the sample agreed that
‘Climate change is just a natural ﬂuctuation in earth’s tempera-
tures’ and 22.4% agreed that ‘I am uncertain about whether climate
change is really happening’; furthermore, most participants are
skeptical about claims made in the media about climate change
and feel they need more information to form a clear opinion about
it (see Whitmarsh et al., 2009).
Participants evidently recognize the main causes of climate
change, including emissions from deforestation, industry, trans-
port and (more generally) fossil fuel use (Fig. 2). However,
misperceptions exist in respect of the relative contribution of
different activities or processes in causing climate change. An
important misperception occurs in the lack of recognition of the
[(Fig._2)TD$FIG]
Fig. 2. Perceived contribution of different activities and processes to climate change.
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contribution of meat eating/production contributing to green-
house gas emissions.McMichael et al. (2007) note how agricultural
and especially livestock-based activities account for around a ﬁfth
of emissions globally, in their proposal for a restriction in the
production and consumption of red meat. In general, people
identify the causes of climate change with more ‘distant’ activities,
namely industry and deforestation, rather than their own actions2.
Participants’ perceptions of climate change as a non-salient issue
are also reﬂected in their beliefs about the impacts of climate
change, with only 53% agreeing ‘climate change is something that
is affecting or is going to affect me, personally’.
When asked about aspects of climate change and energy which
participants are interested in, the most popular response was
seasonal/weather change in the UK (73.2%; see Table 1). This is
consistent with the conceptual association of climate (change) and
weather noted in previous research (e.g., Whitmarsh, 2009b).
However, it is also likely that this is relatively easy to monitor; in
many other cases, seeking information requires more than simply
looking out of the window! Most participants also indicate they
keep an eye on the availability of energy-efﬁcient appliances
(61.3%), and actions individuals can take to reduce their emissions
(57.5%).
4.1.2. Awareness and knowledge about carbon
Moving from climate change in general to more speciﬁc
knowledge around ‘carbon’, we ﬁnd levels of awareness and
engagement decrease (Fig. 3). A minority of the sample state they
know ‘nothing’ about ‘climate change’ (5%) or ‘CO2/carbon dioxide
emissions’ (7%), rising to 12% of participants for the term ‘carbon
footprint’. While over half of the sample indicates they know ‘a lot’
or ‘a fair amount’ about the term ‘carbon footprint’, only one in ten
of those surveyed had actually used a carbon calculator towork out
their carbon footprint.
Findings from this survey highlight the diverse meanings
associatedwith the term ‘carbon’. In order to prompt links between
carbon and climate change, the survey asked ‘When you hear
statements such as ‘‘carbon emissions are increasing’’ or ‘‘the
company is aiming to become carbon-neutral’’ what do you
understand by the word ‘‘carbon’’?’ The most common response
term (by 26.5% of respondents) was ‘carbon dioxide’ or ‘CO2’.
Similar, technical or scientiﬁc framings include:
‘Element (atomic no.12) essential in organic compounds and
acidic gas emissions [. . .]’ (P13)
‘Carbon in organic compounds and CO2 + CH4’ (P134)
However, many responses were less technical or suggested
moral or cultural framings (or social representations). In particular,
‘pollution’ (8%) and environmental ‘destruction’ (4.9%) were fairly
common responses–consistent with previous research on how the
public conceive of climate change (Whitmarsh, 2009b) and the
environment in general (e.g., Douglas, 1992). In some cases, these
framings implied some normative conception of how humans
should relate to the natural environment and that the human-
nature relationship is currently dysfunctional. Typical moral
framings include:
‘a toxic substance, a polluting gas that clogs up the air and rips
off the ozone layer’ (P400)
‘The irreversible impact humans have on planet’ (P67)
Far fewer thought about carbon as natural, abundant and
benign (e.g., the basis of life; cited by 4 people) than as an
anthropogenic cause of climate change, harmful and toxic3.
Responses also suggest a number of misperceptions exist in
understanding about carbon emissions. For example, some
indicated ozone depletion is caused by carbon emissions (a
common misperception – see, e.g., Whitmarsh, 2009b). We also
ﬁnd confusion around carbon monoxide as a cause of climate
change, which has not previously beenmentioned in the literature.
Examples of both of these types of misperceptions include:
‘The emissions that are potentially damaging the ozone layer’
(P183)
‘Carbon monoxide that is omitted [sic] into the atmosphere’
(P465)
Table 1
Topics of information.
Which, if any, of these things do you personally keep an eye on? %
How the climate and seasons seem to be changing in the UK 73.2
Availability of more energy-efﬁcient appliances for the home 61.3
Debates about the future of energy provision
(e.g., nuclear power, renewables)
58.3
Actions I can take to reduce carbon emissions 57.5
New technologies to reduce carbon emissions 55.2
UK government policy on climate change 53.4
International agreements on climate change 45.0
New scientiﬁc knowledge about climate change 40.7
Impacts of climate change on developing countries 40.3
Which political parties have the strongest climate change policies 30.0
Which companies are doing the most to reduce carbon emissions 25.0
Indications of embedded carbon, e.g., carbon labels, ‘by
air’ food labels
25.0
Other aspects of climate change or energy 8.9
[(Fig._3)TD$FIG]
Fig. 3. Knowledge about emissions-related terminology. Respondents were asked
‘How much, if anything, would you say you know about the following terms: CO2/
carbon dioxide emissions; carbon footprint’.
2 It is worth noting a limitation with the measure we used here: we asked about
the scale of contribution of different activities – i.e., ‘a lot’, a little’, ‘nothing’ – but
these are of course very broad response options and difﬁcult to assess even bymore
expert groups. We suggest future research might focus instead on asking
participants to rank the contributions of these activities, and add a timescale
element to the question to both provide a better assessment of individuals’
understanding, such as: ‘How much do you think the following activities have
contributed to causing climate change over the last 100 years? Please rank them in
order (1 = biggest contribution, 10 = least contribution)’.
3 Again, we note a limitation with our measure: the wording of the question may
have steered respondents to consider carbon as negative since we mention the
concept of carbon neutrality.
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Furthermore, uncertainty and lack of knowledge is a common
theme in participants’ understanding of carbon, consistent with
respondents’ attitudes to climate change. Typical responses
include:
’A compound found in gases that MAY be bad for the
environment’ (P61)
‘Not a great deal, but do know it is damaging the environment’
(P36)
Last, as others have also noted (e.g., Lorenzoni et al., 2007;
O’Neill andNicholson-Cole, 2009), we ﬁnd respondents’ qualitative
responses generally make little connection between carbon and
personal choices or actions, with the role of industry in producing
emissions often highlighted4:
‘Polluting substances going into the air, primarily from fossil
fuels’ (P25)
‘A substance that accelerates global warming’ (P471)
‘A by-product that industry is producing’ (P503)
4.2. Individual behaviors or practices
Weaskedwhether respondents had taken actions to reduce their
emissions. The results show domestic energy conservation is
relatively common, but changing travel and shopping habits are
less popular (see Table 2 for frequent actions;Whitmarsh et al., 2009
report ﬁndings relating to infrequent actions, such as installing
insulation). For example, 67% claim they ‘always’ turn off lights they
are not using, whereas only 33%walk, cycle or take public transport
for short journeys (i.e., trips of less than 3 miles) and 13% eat food
which is organic, locally grown or in season. Even fewer – 9% – avoid
eating meat. Consistent with the widely reported reluctance to
change travel habits (e.g., Defra, 2007b), most participants in our
survey (62%) use a car at least 3 times perweek; and 51% have taken
at least one ﬂight for social or leisure reasons in the past year.
Further, consistent with previous research (e.g., Lorenzoni et al.,
2007), peoplearemorewilling to recycle (71%say theyalwaysdo so)
than to take any direct energy conservation actions.
4.3. Engagement with systems of provision and governance5
As Table 2 demonstrates, a large proportion of respondents
undertake some individualized pro-environmental actions. There
is some evidence of engagement beyond these individualized
contexts within systems of provision: for example, 58.3% of
participants state they keep abreast of debates on energy futures,
such as on the role of nuclear power (Table 1). Yet more active
engagement activities, such as keeping an eye on embedded
carbon indicators or ‘by air’ labels were only undertaken by a
quarter of participants.
A lack of participation and engagement with systems of
governance was found throughout the survey. Although over half
of participants state they are interested in national government
climate policy, only a quarter of participants actually keep an eye
on which political parties have the strongest climate policies,
indicating that, as others have found, the environment remains a
low priority issue at election time (Whiteley et al., 2005). As shown
in Table 2, over 90% of participants have never written to their MP
about an environmental issue, and the same proportion has never
taken part in a protest about an environmental issue. It is worth
pointing out that political actions about any issue are relatively
uncommon (Hansard, 2008), highlighting the general political
disenfranchisement, distrust, and fatalism amongst the British
public noted elsewhere (e.g., Grove-White, 1996).
5. Discussion and implications for developing carbon
capability
The research ﬁndings presented here on the three dimensions
of carbon capability reinforce earlier research that indicates little
connection (or ‘objectiﬁcation’) between individuals and climate
change. Carbon emissions are rarely linked to personal actions and
lifestyles choices, and consistent with previous studies, we ﬁnd
that few people are taking signiﬁcant steps to lead a low-carbon
lifestyle. The research offers new insights into how individuals
learn about (the causes of) climate change, particularly how
‘anchoring’ occurs in relation to other (similar) environmental
issues, such as ozone depletion and carbonmonoxide (cf. Kempton,
1991; Whitmarsh, 2009b); and how understanding about carbon
Table 2
Regular pro-environmental actions.
Please indicate how often you take each action: Always (%) Often (%) Occasionally (%) Never (%)
Conservation and consumer actions
Recycle 70.7 23 5.1 1.1
Turn off lights you are not using 67.2 28.8 3.4 0.6
Turn off the tap while you brush your teeth 55.1 24.2 10.2 10.6
Drive economically (e.g., braking or accelerating gently) 36.2 40 12.6 11.3
Compost your kitchen waste 35.8 10.2 14.8 39.3
Walk, cycle or take public transport for short journeys (i.e., trips of less than 3 miles) 33.3 37 21.8 7.9
Reuse or repair items instead of throwing them away 31.7 39.6 25.1 3.7
Save water by taking shorter showers 30.2 28.6 22 19.3
Cut down on the amount you ﬂy 23.8 17.6 23.2 35.4
Eat food which is organic, locally grown or in season 12.6 50.3 28.6 8.6
Buy products with less packaging 11 41.9 37.8 9.3
Avoid eating meat 8.7 9.8 24.3 57.2
Share a car journey with someone else 8.3 22.4 44.6 24.8
Buy environmentally friendly products 8.3 42.1 43.4 6.2
Use an alternative to travelling (e.g., shopping online) 6.1 24.6 30.5 38.8
Political actions
Take part in a protest about an environmental issue 0.6 1 7.7 90.7
Write to your MP about an environmental issue 0.4 1.5 7.1 91
4 However, we acknowledge that the question wording may have inﬂuenced
responses to some extent here, since one of the example statements given (‘‘the
company is aiming to become carbon-neutral’’) was an industrial framing.
5 We should note that the survey did not ask about involvement with community
groups, which would need to be considered for a more complete analysis of carbon
capability.
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and climate change may form part of larger cultural framings or
discourses about the dysfunctional human-nature relationship and
‘pollution’ (cf. Douglas, 1992). Furthermore, while some engage-
ment with systems of provision was noted in the survey, it rarely
extends into more active engagement activities, which may reﬂect
the widespread political apathy and mistrust amongst the UK
public noted in other research (e.g., Hansard, 2008).
What does this mean for policy? We argue that these ﬁndings
show that public carbon capability is below the levels required for
active citizen engagement with climate change which would lead
to carbon-reduction activities. However, we do not principally (or
solely) blame individuals’ lack of knowledge and understanding
for their low levels of pro-environmental behavior. Rather, our
ﬁndings are consistent with substantial existing evidence (e.g.,
Stern, 2000; Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Whitmarsh, 2009a) that
current systems of provision are often not conducive to such
practices; and that contextual barriers contribute to the widely
reported ‘value-action gap’ (Blake, 1999). For example, we found
that knowledge about the contribution of car use and ﬂying to
climate change is high (over 90% acknowledging that vehicle and
aeroplane emissions are a cause of climate change), but that
change in relation to these transport behaviors is much lower (6–
36%, depending on the particular transport behavior). We
therefore cannot exclude considerations of the social meanings
and institutions associatedwith driving and ﬂying (e.g., Barr et al.,
2008), and the availability or otherwise of practical low-carbon
alternative systems of transport provision (e.g., Lorenzoni et al.,
2007). We conclude that there are likely to be interlinked
deﬁciencies along all three dimensions of carbon capability
(decision-making, practices, and structural engagement), which
undermine the foundations of a carbon-reduction policy context
requiring voluntary action by individuals. Given this context, we
argue that raising levels of carbon capability is a necessary but not
sufﬁcient condition for increasing carbon-reduction lifestyle
changes. Furthermore, achieving policy targets for individual
carbon-reduction will require measures to improve these
capabilities by addressing all three aspects simultaneously. This
integrative policy approach is all themore vital given the potential
for information on households’ carbon-emitting activities to be
counter-productive under unsupportive institutional conditions;
that is, where recommended actions are unfeasible or unappeal-
ing, or responsibility for action located elsewhere, information
may induce guilt, disinterest or disempowerment (O’Neill and
Nicholson-Cole, 2009; Hargreaves, 2010). Below, we outline what
some of the policy measures might look like, mapped onto
Spaargaren’s model which illustrates the dialectical relationships
between structure and agency, resulting in particular sets of social
practices.
The ﬁrst dimension of carbon capability comprises knowledge,
understandingandmotivations toact. Thesurveyﬁndingsshowthat
certain misperceptions continue to prevail and that there is limited
awareness of the relative contribution of different activities to
causing climate change. This suggests a role for communication and
education to provide relevant information to guide effective
mitigative action. We stress, however, that this communication
effort should be grounded in situated contexts and social meanings,
and needs to be cognizant of the ways that individuals learn. Social
Representation Theory (Moscovici, 1988) suggests that there is a
need for objectiﬁcation –making carbon tangible and concrete. This
couldbeachieved through informational approaches thateffectively
re-materialize energy and carbon (e.g., carbon labeling, smart
meters, etc.; Burgess and Nye, 2008; HM Government, 2009). The
Theory also suggests anchoring within pre-existing frameworks is
needed in order to render the unfamiliar, familiar. So for example,
the concept of ‘carbon’ could be anchored within existing frames of
lifestyle, ﬁnance or morality (Nerlich and Koteyko, 2009). Such
tailored informational approachesmayalsohelpaddress theevident
limited public motivation to adopt low-carbon lifestyles (and,
particularly, to change travel, shopping and eating habits). By
highlighting personal (e.g., health, ﬁnancial) as well as social and
environmental beneﬁts of action, individuals may be persuaded to
move away from carbon-intensive choices (e.g., eating meat,
driving) towards low-carbon alternatives (e.g., vegetarianism,
cycling; see Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Motivation is also, of course,
closely connected to the availability and attractiveness of low-
carbon options, which are addressed through structural change, as
we now discuss.
Moving from the actor to the structure side of the social
practices diagram, and the third dimension of carbon capability
(broader engagement with systems of provision and governance),
we can identify two complementary courses of action. The ﬁrst is
for individuals to inﬂuence the rules and resourceswhich comprise
the governance structures of carbon, for instance through civic
engagement (e.g., voting, lobbying, protesting, deliberative partic-
ipation in policy-making). These new rules might take the form of
carbon pricing, carbon allowances (for citizens, businesses or
both), emissions regulation (e.g., carbon-capping of energy
companies), low-carbon planning and transport policies, renew-
able energy policies, and so on. These measures would set quite
different frameworks for potential repertoires of action, which
would ﬁlter through systems of provision to inﬂuence the sets of
social practices which are possible. Secondly, there is scope for the
public to shape systems of provision directly, through engagement
in environmental activism at the community level. For example,
the Transition Towns movement seeks to create alternative, low-
carbon systems of provision to replace existing infrastructures
(Haxeltine and Seyfang, 2009) and is just one of many ‘grassroots
innovations’ which aim to achieve system-wide change through
collective community-based action (Seyfang, 2009). Clearly, the
impacts and inﬂuence of such initiatives are currently limited as
they are working in opposition to many societal institutions (e.g.,
externalizing environmental costs), and would be enormously
enhanced by structural changes such as those mentioned above.
Improvements in the social practices element of carbon capability
should arise naturally out of a combination of the other two
elements providing greater understanding and motivation to act,
within an enabling structural framework of systems of provision
and governance which offer practical options for low-carbon social
practices and individual choices.
6. Conclusions
Achieving ambitious policy targets for carbon reduction
depends on societal engagement with climate change and GHG
mitigation. In the current policy context which places considerable
responsibility for carbon reduction with individuals, we have here
considered the extent to which the public is appropriately
equipped to engage in (voluntary) GHG mitigation, that is how
‘carbon capable’ they are. The construct of ‘carbon capability’
delineates the skills, situated knowledge, motivation, and capacity
to cut carbon. In order to elucidate the dimensions of carbon
capability, we have attempted to synthesize psychological and
sociological considerations of the factors inﬂuencing public
engagement in individual, community and civic action to help
mitigate climate change. These considerations include processes of
individual learning (e.g., objectiﬁcation, anchoring) and construc-
tion of situated knowledge, as well as engagement with systems of
provision and governance and the complex agency-structure
dialectic that co-produces social practices.
Our survey shows that carbon capability is limited along all
three dimensions of this construct, namely decision-making
(knowledge, skills, motivation, judgment); individual behavior or
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practices; and broader civic and community engagement.
Consistent with previous literature on public engagement with
climate change and carbon, we ﬁnd that carbon is not a salient
consideration in everyday decision-making, that misperceptions
exist, and that the disparity between knowledge and behavior
(the ‘value-action gap’) would suggest certain barriers constrain
the ability of even knowledgeable and motivated individuals to
act. The low uptake of alternatives to driving and ﬂying, for
example, likely reﬂects structural and cultural barriers to
behavior change (Lorenzoni et al., 2007), while limited civic
and community engagement point to a perceived lack of
opportunities for, and efﬁcacy of, individual participation in
social change (e.g., Grove-White, 1996) or climate change
mitigation (Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2003). While carbon educa-
tion may remove informational (and to a lesser extent,
motivational) barriers to behavior change, structural measures
are also required to encourage lifestyle change and enable
participation in broader social change.
This research represents an initial investigation of carbon
capability, and as such includes only indicative measures. Further
work should build on this study by incorporating a more complete
and contextual set of carbon capability indicators, as well as
exploring the links between carbon capability and sustainability
literacy (see Stibbe, 2009). This could include, for example,
individuals’ evaluation of different information sources (in terms
of bias, agenda, uncertainty, etc.) about carbon and climate change;
their ability to budget and plan energy use; motivations for and
barriers to engagement in community action to reduce carbon
emissions; and individuals’ consideration of carbon in everyday
decisions and actions (e.g., through ethnographic approaches).
Through this research agenda, we may better understand the
public’s (actual and potential) role in tackling climate change and
achieving carbon-reduction targets.
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